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Introduction 
 
The World Health Organization defines violence (1) as: 
“The intentional use of physical force or power, threatened or actual, against 
oneself, another person, or against a group or community, that either results in 
or has a high likelihood of resulting in injury, death, psychological harm, 
maldevelopment, or deprivation.” 
Figure 1 provides a typology that allows one to consider different types of violence 
according to the characteristics of those committing the violent act. Thus, self-
directed violence refers to violence inflicted upon oneself, interpersonal violence 
refers to violence inflicted by another individual or a small group of individuals, and 
collective violence refers to violence inflicted by larger groups such as states or 
organized political and military groups. 
 
This paper discusses some of the health linkages of human security that are mediated 
through violence. It develops and supports five assertions: 
 Violence is a central threat to human security under all widely prevailing 
conceptions of human security 
 The types of violence constituting this threat include both collective violence and 
interpersonal violence 
 These types of violence share determinants that are inextricably linked with some 
of the major issues underlying the increased attention that human security has 
received over the last decade 
 3 
 Coherent policy recommendations to prevent violence would have cross-cutting 
benefits in terms of reducing a number of threats to human security 
Violence, as a human security threat, constitutes a core public health issue. Finally, in 
an era of globalized threats requiring international cooperation, the discussion focuses 
on the interstate spillover effects of violence, or in other words, the transnational 
dimensions of the problem. These arguments are linked to the notion of security as a 
“contested concept” in the 21st century; in particular our analysis focuses on the 
implications of the violence case study for conceptualizing sovereignty, the core 
concept underpinning international relations. 
 
Violence as a health problem 
Before developing discussion around these five points, some attention should be given 
to the attributes and effects of violence that may make it difficult for some to perceive 
violence as a health problem. On its face, some may feel such discussion unnecessary. 
After all, one need only consider a physical assault requiring medical attention to 
make the point that health effects can and do arise following perpetration of violence. 
However, even though there are obvious health effects that result from violence, these 
effects arise in a much more manifest way from the interaction of a person with his or 
her external environment than most other communicable or noncommunicable health 
conditions. With infectious disease, while the external environment is exceedingly 
important in providing suitable conditions for infectious agents and their various 
vectors, one tends to consider the ‘illness’ within the context of the physiological 
processes that begin following the entry of an infectious agent into a human host. 
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Similarly, the ‘illness’ aspects of noncommunicable conditions such as cardiovascular 
diseases or malignant processes tend to be considered in terms of physiological 
changes occurring within a person.  
In contrast, the health effects arising from perpetration of violence clearly involve an 
interaction between a victim and a perpetrator. Whether the mechanism by which 
violence is inflicted involves forcible restraint or threat of lethal injury during rape or 
a speeding bullet, there can be no denying that this use of force, essential to the 
definition of violence, occurs external to the body. 
While the intentional use of physical force or power against a person is characteristic 
of violence, and requires that the health effects of violence are mediated through one’s 
external environment, this feature is by no means unique among the various processes 
that lead to health outcomes. Although one may focus more easily on the internal 
physiological changes such as fever and convulsions in a child with malaria, the fact 
remains that the malaria parasite (or any other infectious agent) has entered that child 
through an interaction with the child’s external environment. Similarly, with many 
noncommunicable diseases, well prior to a cancerous change within a cell or the 
deposition of fatty material within a blood vessel, an interaction has taken place with 
one’s external environment.  
On reflection therefore, the external environment is an important consideration for 
many health outcomes. A major and striking difference with violence, however, is 
that the time lag between an interaction with one’s environment and the health effects 
produced tends to be very short. While there are certainly long-term health effects 
arising from exposure to violence, the immediate health effects―the fractured bones, 
the collapse in blood volume―appear without an incubation or latency period to 
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temporally separate the connection between these effects and the contributory role of 
one’s environment. 
Whether this clear and immediate connection with the external environment causes 
people to view violence more as a criminal justice issue; whether since violence so 
frequently involves an interaction between individuals, some see it from a 
sociological perspective; or whether it is so patently obvious that health effects arise 
from violence that people overlook the health connection in order to establish more 
meaningful connections; some need to be reminded that violence is, among other 
things, a health issue. 
Indeed, it is not merely because violence gives rise to health effects that it is important 
and useful to consider violence from a public health perspective. Those with an 
interest in the health of populations have always attempted to understand interactions 
between humans and their environment, and determine how this relates to health 
problems. Deeper consideration of violence reveals many attributes shared with other 
health problems―the most important being that violence is not a random event. 
Age is one of the more striking associations: violence disproportionately affects 
individuals during their most productive years. In 1998, interpersonal violence, 
collective violence, and self-directed violence accounted for three of the top six 
causes of death for individuals of either sex aged 15 to 44 in low- and middle-income 
countries (2). Interpersonal and self-directed violence were the second and third 
leading causes of death for the same age group in high-income countries (2). In 2002, 
the World Health Organization released the World report on violence and health, 
which estimates that 1.6 million people worldwide lost their lives to violence during 
2000 (1). Apart from the associations with age, the Report also draws attention to a 
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number of the gender dimensions of violence, with males being victims in over three 
quarters of homicides and females overwhelmingly represented as victims of forms of 
interpersonal violence such as intimate partner and sexual violence. 
Over and above the age and gender associations, country income is a potent predictor 
of violence rates. Violent death rates for low- to middle-income countries are more 
than twice those of high-income countries, and over 90% of violent deaths occur in 
low- and middle-income countries (1).
 
As will be developed later in this paper, 
socioeconomic gradients at more localized levels also correlate closely with rates of 
violence. 
Thus, not only is violence a significant contributor to global morbidity and mortality, 
its occurrence is far from random. Violence is poorly explained as a criminal act 
committed by isolated individuals, and much more usefully understood as a behavior 
determined by economic and social development fault lines at the transnational and 
societal levels, interacting with individual-, familial-, and community-level factors. In 
sum, violence is a global public health problem that requires a multi-sectoral 
approach. On reflection, something which is not so very different from the large-scale 
drainage projects in southern Europe to eradicate malaria, or combined efforts of 
government and industry to control and reduce exposure to lead. 
 
Violence is a threat to human security 
So it seems both useful and eminently appropriate to consider violence as a global 
public health problem, but is it a threat to human security? A brief look at any of the 
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widely prevailing conceptions of human security leaves little doubt that violence is 
indeed a threat to human security. 
A characteristic of the human security perspective is that the individual, rather than 
the state, is the referent object of concern; the value base of human security is 
squarely people-centered. However, when it comes to defining how broadly or 
narrowly one should consider threats to the individual, opinions diverge. 
Those who consider a broad range of threats typically have a development-oriented 
view of human security. In 1994, the Human Development Report from the United 
Nations Development Program (UNDP) articulates a widely cited conception of 
human security: 
“Human security encompasses economic security, food security, health security, 
environmental security, personal security, community security, and political 
security” (3). 
Under this conception, human security includes threats arising, inter alia, from 
poverty, hunger and famine, health outcomes, violence, political repression, and 
environmental degradation. In discussing the threat of violence the report elaborates: 
“Perhaps no other aspect of human security is so vital for people as their 
security from physical violence. In poor nations and rich, human life is 
increasingly threatened by sudden, unpredictable violence” (3). 
Those who view threats to human security more narrowly tend to emphasize those 
issues posing a direct threat to the personal safety and well being of the individual. 
The Canadian government is one of the more readily identified proponents of a 
narrower range of threats (4, 5). 
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A criticism of the broad conception of human security has been that it conflates a 
broad range of threats to the individual under the banner of ‘insecurity.’ While this 
heading may offer advantages of advocacy and mobilizing diverse constituencies, it 
has been argued that it does so at the cost of undermining the descriptive power of the 
concept of human security. On the other hand, the broader conception of threats better 
reflects the values underlying concern for the well-being of individuals, and is less 
concerned with analytical methods to support it. 
This paper does not advocate either a broad or narrow conception of threats. Of far 
greater relevance is that violence remains a central concern to either viewpoint. 
Indeed, as Kanti Bajpai points out, violence figures prominently in the overlap 
between the two threat agendas: 
“Most of the threats listed by both the UNDP and Canadian government papers 
relate to personal safety and well being. Both identify indirect and direct threats. 
Amongst the direct threats, they both list everyday violent crime, child abuse, 
and abuse of women. Much higher up the ladder towards more organized direct 
violence, they both list government repression, terrorism, and genocide. Canada 
lists, in addition, various other kinds of direct violence – call it societal violence 
– that endanger personal safety including the existence of private security 
forces, banditry, warlordism, internal war, and ethnic violence. The Canadian 
writings in particular include organized violence that is more familiar in security 
thinking―transnational violence and international/global violence” (6). 
Clearly, the threat of violence to the individual remains a central preoccupation, 
whether one’s conception of human security focuses on a narrow range of threats or a 
broader one. Violence―whether interpersonal or collective―has been a central and 
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consistently articulated concern for many scholars and political figures who have 
sought to define human security from either a broad or a narrow perspective.
1,2,3,4 
Moreover, both of these perspectives contend that the traditional concept of security 
that dominated the Cold War era, focusing on the threat of military aggression across 
borders and the military means to face such threats, is not sufficient to conceptualize 
the international security challenges that have emerged in the post Cold War era. 
While the end of the Cold War does not mean that these traditional security issues are 
no longer relevant, there are mounting demands that the security agenda should 
provide space for the threats to human life and collective security, often non-military 
in origin, such as interpersonal and ethnic violence, organized crime, and economic 
instability (7). 
More recent developments in refining the concept of human security also keep 
violence squarely anchored within the human security discourse. Through a variety of 
meetings and consultations since its inception, the Commission on Human Security 
has elaborated a working definition of human security that advocates the objective of 
human security is to safeguard the vital core of all human lives from critical and 
pervasive threats (8). The term ‘vital core’ includes elements such as the rights and 
freedoms allowing survival, livelihood, and basic dignity. The two essential attributes 
                                                 
1
 “Once synonymous with the defense of territory from external attack, the requirements of security 
today have come to embrace the protection of communities and individuals from internal violence.” 
Kofi Annan Millennium Report, Chapter 3, p. 43-44. 
2
 “Several key elements make up human security. A first essential element is the possibility for all 
citizens to live in peace and security within their own borders. This implies the capacity of states and 
citizens to prevent and resolve conflicts through peaceful and nonviolent means and, after the conflict 
is over, the ability to effectively carry out reconciliation efforts.” Sadako Ogata, Asian Development 
Bank Seminar, 27 April 1998. 
3
 “What do we mean by human security? We mean, in its most simple expression, all those things that 
men and women anywhere in the world cherish most: enough food for the family; adequate shelter; 
good health; schooling for the children; protection from violence whether inflicted by man or by 
nature; and a State which does not oppress its citizens but rules with their consent.” United Nations 
Deputy Secretary-General Louise Frechette, Vienna International Center, 9 October 1999. 
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of the term ‘critical and pervasive threats’ are that these threats affect core activities 
of human lives and do so on a large scale and/or in a nonanomalous manner (8).
 
Clearly violence in many forms has direct negative impacts on survival, livelihood, 
and basic dignity. The large scale and nonanomalous aspects of violence will be 
covered in the next section, which develops a profile of the forms of violence that 
constitute critical and pervasive threats to populations around the globe. 
 
Violence as a critical and pervasive threat – a global overview 
Table 1 provides estimated deaths due to collective violence from the 16
th
 through the 
20
th
 centuries. Despite the large degree of uncertainty surrounding these estimates, the 
rise in death rates, particularly pronounced in the 20
th
 century, is nevertheless striking. 
 
According to the World health report 2001, an estimated 310,000 people lost their 
lives as a direct result of collective violence during 2000, with over half of these 
deaths occurring in sub-Saharan Africa, and men aged 15 to 44 accounting for well 
over a third of mortality (9). Estimating nonfatal outcomes is difficult; however, the 
numbers are likely to be substantial given that the ratio of injured to killed among 
military personnel across a wide range of conflict settings, derived by dividing the 
number of combatants wounded to those killed, has been reported to range from 1.9 to 
13.0, with an average around 3.0 (10). 
A wide variety of indirect effects on health arise from the disruptive social changes 
that accompany collective violence. Collective violence typically creates population 
                                                                                                                                           
4
 “Human security relates to the protection of the individual’s personal safety and freedom from direct 
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displacement and a substantial degradation of social infrastructure, such as health care 
systems and food production and distribution networks (11, 12). Not infrequently, 
life-sustaining civilian infrastructure is specifically targeted in conflicts through acts 
such as the destruction of food and water distribution complexes and the execution of 
health care workers (13, 14). Research in these settings has shown a significant 
reduction in indicators such as vaccination status that accompany collective violence 
(15). Furthermore, many efforts to control or eradicate disease that have been 
dramatically successful elsewhere founder in settings where collective violence is 
occurring. 
While it is difficult to estimate with precision the burden of health effects that are 
attributable to these changes, evidence suggests it is substantial. Crude mortality rates 
in displaced populations fleeing collective violence have been reported at 5 to 12 
times the baseline rates (16), and were substantially higher among those fleeing the 
Rwandan genocide who arrived in Goma (17). The primary causes of death in these 
circumstances are communicable diseases and malnutrition, and the incidence of 
AIDS in Africa is thought to have increased considerably as a direct result of civil 
wars (18, 19). Beyond the morbidity and mortality related to communicable disease 
and malnutrition, a broad range of health outcomes has been documented in 
populations exposed to collective violence, including disability and psychosocial and 
reproductive health sequelae (17). 
Furthermore, due to the nature of collective violence, it seems reasonable to expect 
that these indirect health effects would not be limited to the time period during which 
the violence occurs. A recent statistical assessment using cross sectional data indicates 
                                                                                                                                           
and indirect threats of violence.” Kanti Bajpai, Joan B. Kroc Institute Report, No. 19. Fall 2000, p. 48. 
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that the total disability adjusted life years (DALYs) lost in 1999 due to the indirect 
effects of collective violence from 1991 to 1997, was about the same as the number 
lost through direct effects of collective violence in 1999 (16). 
There seems to be little doubt that collective violence constitutes a ‘critical and 
pervasive threat’ to the vital core of human well-being in regions where it is 
occurring. Indeed, most people who think of violence in relation to human security 
probably consider war as the primary violence-mediated human security threat. The 
Rwandan genocide and ethnic cleansing in the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
are rightly viewed as watershed events in the development of the human security 
discourse, not least for the catastrophic loss of life that accompanied this collective 
violence, but also for the dilemma these events posed to an international community 
struggling to value state sovereignty and human security simultaneously. 
But what about interpersonal violence? Are there settings in which interpersonal 
violence constitutes a critical and pervasive threat? The World report on violence and 
health estimates that in the year 2000, interpersonal violence accounted for almost 
twice as many deaths as collective violence (1). There is an obvious difference in 
terms of public visibility―collective violence tends to be heavily mediatized while 
interpersonal violence in many forms tends to be concealed. For example, Brazil is 
not a country at war. Largely because of this, few people would be aware that in 
addition to the 467 Israeli or Palestinian minors killed due to conflict from 1987 to 
2001, a staggering 3937 children under the age of eighteen were murdered by firearms 
in the municipality of Rio de Janeiro alone―an eightfold difference (20). 
Across Latin and Central America, particularly in urban areas, violence is a daily 
threat. The ACTIVA project was a multicenter study coordinated by the Pan 
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American Health Organization to assess violence and related norms and attitudes in 
selected cities in Latin and Central America as well as Madrid (21). Almost 11,000 
interviews were conducted among a sample that stratified population groups 
according to socioeconomic level and population density within the eight cities 
involved. The sample represented the relevant urban populations from ages 18 to 70, 
and was of sufficient size to permit estimates with 95% reliability. The proportion of 
respondents indicating that they had been victims of violence (armed robbery, 
extortion by a public authority, physical assault, or knife or bullet wounds) during the 
prior 12 months ranged from 10.6% in Santiago, Chile, to 38.5% in San Salvador, El 
Salvador. 
Urban violence has begun to attract an increasing amount of research attention; some 
aspects will be discussed in the subsequent section. It should be noted however that 
while the largest cities were located in high income countries until the 1960s, this is 
no longer the case. Today some of the world’s largest cities, and the megacities of the 
future, are found in the developing world (22). It has been estimated that every five 
years, 60% of inhabitants of cities with populations of 100,000 or more become 
victims of violence (22). 
The Banshbari slum is located in the midwestern part of Dhaka, Bangladesh. 
Although throughout the 1970s it was a rapidly growing urban slum, its residential 
population has decreased during the 1990s, due to newly established housing 
societies, to around 2000. Those who remain are both politically and economically 
marginalized. Participatory rural appraisal methods have been used to probe residents’ 
perceptions of violence and insecurity (23). Those interviewed report that the 
occurrence of firearm-related violence has increased steadily since the mid-1990s 
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through to the time of the appraisal, that essential tasks such as gathering firewood are 
fraught with insecurity, and that residents do not go outside after nightfall. There are 
frequent references to the deliberate targeting of women for abduction, rape, and 
trafficking, with one woman reporting: 
“I wish I could run and escape from them because anything can happen to me. I 
can be raped by a number of them….They can traffic me out of the country or 
sell me to a brothel; they can keep me in captivity and use me as a prostitute for 
life. Even if I come back from them somehow, the society will not accept me; 
they will think I am spoilt and nobody will marry me. My family will lose face 
in the society.” 
A central problem in shedding light on the nature of the threat of interpersonal 
violence in settings where it is pervasive is the absence of reliable data. South Africa 
has made considerable inroads in addressing this issue by establishing the National 
Injury Mortality Surveillance System (NIMSS) (24). NIMSS is a mortuary-based 
surveillance system that captures key information on fatal injuries. As of 2001, the 
system provides descriptive data from 32 mortuaries in six provinces and is estimated 
to provide this information for just over a third of externally caused deaths within 
South Africa. The data are biased towards urban areas, although 14 of the mortuaries 
serve largely rural areas. Homicide was the leading cause of death and accounted for 
44% of the 25,361 fatal injuries recorded in 2001, with over half of these inflicted by 
firearms. 
The United States, long cited as the setting with the highest firearm homicide rates 
among high-income countries, experienced what has been described as an epidemic of 
firearm-related violence from the mid-1980s to 1993 (25). During the peak of the 
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epidemic, firearm-related homicide rates reached almost 7 per 100,000 for the 
American population as a whole. However, this aggregate figure disguises the fact 
that rates among age and ethnic groups were much higher. In fact, in many American 
cities a black male who turned 18 in 1989 had roughly a one in 20 chance of being 
murdered by 1995 (26). While the ability to disaggregate data to these finer levels 
makes such analyses possible, it is sobering to reflect that while rates of firearm-
related violence in the United States are definitely high relative to other high-income 
settings, they pale in comparison to rates observed in many low- and middle-income 
settings. Indeed, firearm homicide rates of 40 and 50 per 100,000―roughly sixfold 
higher than the peak of the U.S. epidemic―have been reported to the WHO for Brazil 
and Colombia respectively (27).  
 
Shared determinants – implications for the human security policy agenda 
Despite the readily discernible difference in public visibility, there are a number of 
notable similarities between collective and interpersonal forms of violence. Most 
important for the human security discourse and its policy implications is that both 
forms share a number of determinants and the capacity to be self-perpetuating. 
Indeed, if a central challenge for those engaged in furthering the human security 
discourse is to propose integrated responses to approaching human security threats, 
then discussion of these issues is highly relevant. 
The vulnerability of populations to either interpersonal or collective violence is 
influenced by a variety of factors in the political, economic, and social spheres. These 
include: 
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1. Weak economic development at the country level 
2. Inequalities in access to economic, political, and social resources at the societal 
level 
3. Weak forms of governance and forms that are not socially redistributive  
4. A number of factors linked to globalization, including: 
 Abrupt changes in political and social structures 
 Aspects of globalization linked to financial movements and opportunities 
 Transnational flows of weapons, particularly small arms 
Per capita GDP 
A striking association with both rates of interpersonal violence and the occurrence of 
collective violence is low per capita gross domestic product (GDP) at the country 
level. Over the years, a number of studies have demonstrated the relationship between 
country level GDP per capita and homicide rates (28, 29), and Figure 2 shows 
geographical distribution of estimated rates of youth homicide for 2000. 
Analysts who have studied causes of civil war tend to agree that per capita GDP is an 
important predictor of the risk of armed conflict, although there is disagreement on 
the nature of this relationship. Some stress the importance of incomes that rely on 
primary commodity exports (30), while others offer evidence to contradict this view. 
Others still posit that economic growth generates political instability and potentially 
fuels collective violence in poor economies, while offering a protective effect in 
richer countries (31). 
Horizontal inequalities 
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Disparities in access to economic, political, and social resources at the societal level 
also have been demonstrated to correlate with both interpersonal and collective 
violence. Increasing inequalities in income distribution as measured by indicators 
such as the Gini coefficient correlate with rising homicide rates; this relationship 
persists despite statistical control for a variety of national characteristics and appears 
repeatedly across a number of study settings (32). Similarly, a number of analysts 
have argued that in addition to inequalities in income distribution, unequal access to 
political and social resources, or predominance of one ethnic community over 
another, are powerful drivers of political instability and collective violence (31, 33).
 
Quality of governance 
Given that the vast majority of conflicts occur within states, it is perhaps not 
surprising that a number of scholars cite real or perceived failures of 
governance―whether related to the provision of services and redistribution of social 
goods, the degree of political inclusiveness, or other aspects of perceived quality of 
governance―as an important determinant of conflict (33, 34). In this respect, 
Axworthy observes that: 
“The meaning of security is being transformed. Security traditionally has focused 
on the state because its fundamental purpose is to protect its citizens. Hobbled by 
economic adversity, outrun by globalization, and undermined from within by bad 
governance, the capacity of some states to provide this protection has increasingly 
come into question” (35). 
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Notwithstanding the logic of this viewpoint, it is important to note that there are a 
number of areas where consensus is lacking on fundamental issues such as the 
importance of inclusive democracies as a form of governance, and the causal 
relationship between grievances related to governance and civil conflict. These and a 
host of other issues related to policymaking in relation to collective violence have 
recently received a thorough review (36).  
Forms of governance that provide social redistribution of collective goods and social 
protection correlate with lower rates of interpersonal violence. For example, homicide 
arrest rates have been found to be negatively associated with homicide rates, 
suggesting that modes of governance that actively support the rule of law help to deter 
further violence (37). Various forms of collective social protection, and forms of 
redistribution such as welfare expenditures, have also been shown in association with 
lower rates of interpersonal violence (38, 39).  
Effects of globalization  
Globalization has been defined as a set of processes that intensify human interaction 
by eroding boundaries of time, space, and ideas that have historically separated people 
and nations in a number of spheres of action, including economic, health and 
environmental, social and cultural, knowledge and technology, and political and 
institutional (40). While globalization is not a new phenomenon, the manner in which 
the world has become increasingly interdependent in recent times has created the 
conditions under which populations experience rapid and fundamental social, 
political, and economic changes; globalization in recent times has assumed a 
magnitude―and taken on patterns―unprecedented in world history (41). The 
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interaction of the processes of globalization and the international system is changing 
the face of the security discourse. 
 Health development in the 21
st
 century must take advantage of the opportunities 
afforded by global change and at the same time, minimize the risks and threats 
associated with globalization, such as the negative effects of violence. In this way, the 
dramatic improvements in the health of the world’s population achieved in the 20th 
century can be maintained in the 21
st
 century (41). Negative changes are associated 
with both collective and interpersonal violence and exemplify a downside human 
security risk that may be substantially greater in population impact than would have 
been observed in a less globalized world. 
The end of the Cold War era brought relatively abrupt and far reaching consequences 
to the political and social structures of the former Soviet bloc, as well as radical 
changes affecting livelihood strategies. Comparison of regional trends in youth 
homicide between western Europe and some countries of the former Soviet bloc 
between from 1985 to 1995 illustrates some of the associated changes in interpersonal 
violence that were observed during this period of transition. Homicide rates in the 10 
to 24 age bracket increased by over 150% from 1985 to 1994 in the Russian 
Federation, and by 125% over the same period in Latvia (1). In both settings the 
proportion of homicides attributable to firearms more than doubled. By contrast, 
homicide rates and the proportion attributable to firearms within western Europe 
remained generally low and stable. 
There is general consensus that political instability is a predictor of collective violence 
(31, 36). Furthermore, it has been argued that transitional states are particularly at risk 
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for civil war, whereas either repressive autocracies or inclusive democracies tend to 
have low levels of civil violence (42). 
Financial factors related to globalization may also contribute to changes in violence. 
A recent study of predictors of foreign direct investment indicates that poor rule of 
law and corruption are most detrimental for investment (43). Since forms of 
governance that support respect for the law are associated with lower rates of 
interpersonal violence, countries with high or increasing rates of interpersonal 
violence would appear to be at risk for reduced investment or capital flight, 
potentially aggravating socioeconomic inequities with the possibility for further 
increased rates of interpersonal violence (7).  
With respect to collective violence, there is little doubt that economic motivations 
have played a major role in initiating conflicts, and that the access to global markets 
and trade in commodities from conflict areas has played a substantial role in 
maintaining the ability of parties to the conflict to continue their struggle. The aspects 
of globalization that permit easily concealed payments and expedite exchanges of 
assets greatly facilitate this economic activity. A wide variety of economic networks 
have been used to conduct transborder trade and exploit the global economic system 
in order to support war economies (44).  
Transnational Spillover Effects 
The impact of interpersonal violence on the international system, in particular the 
transnational spillover effects, has yet to be fully studied. However, the global 
epidemiology of interpersonal violence, which clearly demonstrates a world dividing 
into clusters of high-violence and low-violence societies, does not bode well for the 
future stability of the international system. As noted above, these clusters of violence 
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coincide, for the most part, with the division between low-to-middle income and high 
income countries. To the extent that interpersonal violence leaches a society’s 
economic growth potential, it is reasonable to conclude that interpersonal violence is 
widening the gap between the rich and poor.  
Such disparities and the emergence of clusters of intense violence within nations 
enhance the probability of state collapse and disintegration, and the emergence of 
failed states. It may be argued that the contemporary international system already 
contains states and quasi-states, a different situation from a world containing only 
states (45). Such quasi-states have a greater probability of becoming failed states, 
which may be defined as: 
“A situation where the structure, authority (legitimate power), social, and political 
order of a state have fallen apart. This is accompanied by social violence and the 
privatization of security.” ( 46). 
Collapsed or quasi-states often pose a direct threat to their citizens or fail to protect 
them. Failed states and the ensuing random violence, both local and transnational, that 
results from such collapse set off waves of domestic and transnational catastrophes 
such as migration, epidemics of communicable diseases, undernutrition and 
malnutrition, and rape or unsafe sex. Such environments also become prime breeding 
grounds for organized crime and terrorism. These few examples show how the root 
causes of violence are intimately linked and have the potential to propagate other 
public health problems, such as infectious disease epidemics. The uneven and 
contradictory characteristics of our emergent global society are accompanied by 
global social movements, both positive and negative, and the fragmentation of many 
nation-states. 
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Therefore, from an international perspective, violence has the capacity to seriously 
weaken worldwide stability. People flee from violence. According to UNHCR “armed 
conflict is now the driving force behind most refugee flows (47). In other words, in a 
globalized world one cannot be secure if one’s neighbor, even a distant neighbor, is 
not secure. Violence has significant spillover effects. In Austria, for instance, the 
refugee flows from the Balkans led to an anti-foreigner referendum, and most likely 
contributed to the success of the extreme right party in the elections of 1999. 
Another aspect of globalization that is associated with both collective and 
interpersonal violence is the issue of transnational flows of weapons, particularly 
small arms. The movement of these weapons over porous borders following conflicts 
and in the wake of organized crime and the drug trade has attracted increasing 
international concern and attention in recent years. Both collective violence, through 
perpetuation of conflicts and exacerbation of regional instabilities, and interpersonal 
violence, through noncombat-related assaults, have been linked to the uncontrolled 
and widespread availability of these weapons (48).  
Given these shared determinants, it should come as no surprise that collective 
violence and interpersonal violence are interrelated, and that the effects of 
interpersonal violence in an interconnected world are not hermetically contained 
within state boundaries, or for that matter within nonexistent failed state borders. 
Collective violence is associated with an increase in homicide and other crimes, both 
during the phase of violence and thereafter, and also has been shown to lead to 
increased suicide rates in settings bordering civil wars (16). The experience of 
international war has been reported to make the use of violence within states more 
common (49, 50). Moreover, the spillover effects of violence and political 
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disintegration are waves of other public health problems such as communicable 
disease epidemics, rape, the rampant spread of sexually transmitted diseases, and 
mass migration. Thus, interpersonal violence and the concomitant political instability 
it brings represent serious transnational challenges to both the international system 
and global public health. 
Security as a Contested Concept 
In the emerging international relations discourse of the 21
st
 century, many writers 
agree that security is a contested concept. While there is general agreement that 
security implies freedom from threats to core values (for both individuals and groups), 
there are diverging views whether the main focus of the emerging security discourse 
should be on individual, national, or international security (51). Traditionalists argue 
that security issues are within the realm of domestic and not international 
responsibility. However, this realist approach is unable to deal with threats that states 
bring upon their citizens or violent threats that arise within the state; realism 
conceptualizes an ahistoric and abstract international system where anarchy and 
power dominate the relations between states. The concept of state sovereignty 
dominates this view of international relations and is rooted in the origins of the 
modern international system traced back to the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. 
 
This paper argues that the security discourse must go beyond a tightly defined realist 
perspective focusing on interstate military force to include emerging threats, 
especially violence and the determinants of interpersonal violence, as integral human 
security concerns. In an increasingly globalized world, security threats stem from 
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complex systems, both natural (e.g., the ecosystem) and human made (the global 
economy and interpersonal violence), in which individuals, states, and the system all 
play a part, and in which economic, societal, and environmental factors are as 
important as political and military ones (52). In this regard, challenges to the 
international system such as interpersonal violence require a rethinking of state 
sovereignty that includes global attention to the subnational and transnational 
dimensions of interpersonal violence as both a human security and public health 
priority. A sole emphasis on the state, state sovereignty, interstate relations, and 
interstate security―the traditional security paradigm―cannot address the security 
issues outlined in our analysis.  
The human security issues enumerated in this paper provide other dimensions to the 
emerging global security agenda that characterizes the post Cold War era. A security 
paradigm for the 21
st
 century must include space for individual, state, and 
transnational problems, such as the proliferation of interpersonal violence in many 
areas of the world. In other words, it requires a rethinking of conventional notions of 
world politics and international relations. No country alone can address the security 
challenges of this new era in world affairs. In this respect, we believe that contesting 
traditional concepts of security is a positive development, and one that can only lead 
to more effective ways of addressing serious human security challenges such as 
interpersonal violence.  
 
Conclusion 
Consideration of these shared determinants for interpersonal and collective violence 
should bring to mind some areas of policy action that would advance the human 
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the human security issues made more 
broadly in this paper. I’d prefer to keep this 
paragraph. 
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security agenda. Viewed broadly, the intent of these policies should be to address the 
transnational- and societal-level determinants of these forms of violence. 
Strengthening mechanisms may be used to reduce inequalities, promote effective and 
inclusive forms of governance, and protect individuals and populations from the 
downside risks of globalization through better control and transparency of certain 
international markets. Efforts in these areas would have cross-cutting benefits for a 
number of other health and nonhealth threats to human security as well. 
On its face, advancing such an agenda may seem problematic to differences in North-
South priorities. However, the North has a rational interest in preventing violence in 
the South―not least because it effectively bankrolls the costs of this violence through 
collapsed development initiatives, humanitarian aid, and peacekeeping. Illegal 
migration arising from this violence is a volatile political issue for the North (34).  
Interpersonal violence and collective violence exemplify threats to human security, 
and a policy agenda responding to their fundamental determinants would have 
benefits for a number of other human security threats. In addition, interpersonal 
violence and collective violence are important global public health problems; in fact, 
a particularly apt description of ill health was provided by Thomas Hobbes in the 
seventeenth century in describing life without security:  
“In such condition there is no place for industry…no arts; no letters; no society; 
and which is worst of all, continual fear, and danger of violent death; and the 
life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short (53).” 
We therefore contend that if international society ignores the threats to human 
security and public health posed by interpersonal violence, it does so at its peril.  
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Table 1: Estimated historical deaths and annual rates of death due to collective violence, 
16
th
 to 20
th
 centuries 
Century Estimated deaths during 
century (millions) (1) 
Estimated mid-century 
population (millions) (54) 
Estimated annual death 
rate per 100,000 
16
th
 1.6 500 3.2 
17
th
 6.1 545 11.2 
18
th
 7.0 790 8.9 
19
th
 19.4 1260 15.4 
20
th
  109.7 2520 43.5 
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